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Is there a demand for multi-year crop insurance?∗ 
Maria Osipenko†, Zhiwei Shen‡, Martin Odening§ 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we adapt a dynamic discrete choice model to examine the aggregated demand for 
single- and multi-year crop insurance contracts. We show that in a competitive insurance 
market with heterogeneous risk averse farmers, there is simultaneous demand for both 
insurance contracts. Moreover, the introduction of multi-year contracts enhances the market 
penetration of insurance products. Using U.S. corn yield data, we empirically assess the 
potential of multi-year crop insurance. 
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1 Introduction 
There is ample empirical evidence that traditional crop insurance does not attract high 
participation of producers without financial subsidies. In the U.S., for example, more than 60% 
of the total premiums paid by farmers are subsidized. In total, costs for the federal crop 
insurance program add up to $10 billion annually (Goodwin and Smith, 2013). These figures 
imply that for most developing countries, traditional crop insurance would not be fiscally 
feasible. In light of considerable expenses for subsidizing traditional crop insurance programs, 
low participation for unsubsidized insurance and growing risk exposure due to climatic change, 
there is an urgent need for alternative crop insurance products which are affordable. 
Several alternative insurance instruments have been discussed in the literature, such as area 
yield insurance or weather derivatives (Mahul, 1999; Vedenov and Barnett, 2004). Another 
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alternative, which has recently been proposed by Chen and Goodwin (2010), is multi-year crop 
insurance. Multi-year insurance, also known as long-term insurance, is offered at a fixed 
premium per year and has a contract period of more than one year. In contrast to single year 
insurance, it is not possible to raise the premium or to cancel the contract during the contract 
period. Apart from allowing stable premiums, multi-year insurance can also reduce 
administrative costs related to marketing and renewal of insurance contracts (Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan, 2009). A further advantage, cited by Chen and Goodwin (2010), is that fair 
premiums of multi-year crop insurance are smaller than that of single-year contracts, unless 
crop yields are perfectly correlated over time. This feature rests on a time diversification 
argument, i.e., payoffs are pooled across time. A necessary condition for time diversification, 
however, is that all indemnity payments are granted at the end of the contract period. It is likely 
that this feature makes multi-year contracts less attractive to farmers because they may suffer 
liquidity problems before they receive indemnity payments. If, in contrast, indemnities are paid 
immediately in case of a yield loss, multi-year insurance is likely to be more expensive since the 
insurance provider must be compensated for losing the flexibility of premium adjustments. The 
question arises as to whether multi-year crop insurance is still attractive for farmers and 
insurance providers under these conditions.  
To answer this question, we develop a dynamic choice model of insurance alternatives, in 
which single- and multi-year insurance contracts are offered to heterogeneous risk averse 
farmers. Based on an inter-temporal utility function, we derive the aggregated demand for 
single- and multi-year insurance contracts. The theoretical model is then calibrated to U.S. corn 
yields. 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Insurance market 
Following Kleindorfer et al. (2012), we consider the simplest non-trivial setting, a two-period 
two-state model with complete information. We introduce an insurance market in which 
insurance premiums reflect the expected loss plus a risk loading factor which mainly represents 
the reinsurance cost. That is, premiums are exogenously given and not determined by an 
equilibrium model. Risk loading (denoted as 𝑟1) at 𝑡1 is known, while the loading factor 𝑟2𝑤𝑤 
at 𝑡2 is uncertain and depends on the state of the world, 𝑤 ∈ {𝑑,𝑢}. It either increases to 𝑟2𝑢 
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with probability 𝑞 or decreases to 𝑟2𝑑 with probability (1 − 𝑞) depending on a loss occurrence 
at 𝑡1. Thus,  
𝑟2
𝑑 ≤ 𝑟1 ≤ 𝑟2
𝑢.  (1) 
The assumption of time varying risk premiums is plausible since they will be likely adjusted 
when new information on realized losses becomes available. In fact, crop insurance premiums 
in the U.S. were subject to changes in recent years (Risk Management Agency, 2012). 
We focus on a specific type of crop insurance, namely area yield insurance. This is an 
index-based insurance where individual indemnity payments depend on the average yield in a 
region rather than on individual farm yields. This type of insurance is not subject to moral 
hazard and loss adjustment, and thus bypasses obstacles inherent to traditional crop insurance 
(Mahul, 1999). Several index insurance programs have been implemented all over the world, 
particularly in developing countries, such as India, Bangladesh, Mexico, and China. The 
relation between individual farm yields, (𝑦𝑖𝑡)𝑖=1,…,𝑛 and the area yield 𝑦𝑡 is assumed as:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖(𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇) + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛, (2) 
with E𝜀𝑖 = 0 , 𝜀𝑖2 = 𝜎𝑖2 , 𝑦𝑡 ⊥ 𝜀𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡~(𝜇𝑖,𝜎𝑖2),  and 𝑦𝑡~(µ,𝜎2) . 𝐹𝜀𝑖(⋅)  is the cumulative 
density function (CDF) of 𝜀𝑖 ∈ [𝜀𝑖,min, 𝜀𝑖,max]  and 𝐹𝑦𝑡(⋅)  is the CDF of area yield 𝑦𝑡 ∈[0, 𝑦max]. The coefficient 𝛽𝑖 measures the sensitivity of the individual yield to the area yield. It 
determines the risk reduction potential and, in turn, the optimal coverage level of area yield 
insurance (Mahul, 1999). In our model, 𝛽  is a crucial parameter because it allows us to 
introduce heterogeneity of farmers. An empirical distribution of 𝛽 was estimated by Miranda 
(1991). He finds that this parameter varies from 0.1 to 2.03 for U.S. bean producers. ℬ 
represents the set of heterogeneous farmers with different 𝛽, i.e., 𝛽 ∈ ℬ. 𝐹𝛽(?̅?) denotes a 
function counting for the number of farmers with 𝛽 < ?̅?.  
Two types of area yield insurances policies are provided: single-year contracts (SY) and 
multi-year contracts (MY). The indemnity payment for both contracts is: 𝐼𝑡 = max{𝑦𝑐 − 𝑦𝑡, 0} 
paid after each period, where 𝑦𝑡 is the realized area yield at 𝑡 and 𝑦𝑐 is a trigger value. MY 
contracts have a fixed annual premium 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 4F
1. The price of SY contracts at 𝑡1 is 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 and is 
known, but 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑤𝑤  at 𝑡2 can either increase to 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢  or decrease to 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑  depending on the level 
of reinsurance costs. Formally stated: 
1 For simplicity, farmers are not allowed to cancel MY at 𝑡2. In other words, the cancellation fee may be too high 
for farmers to terminate the MY contract within contract periods. 
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𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 = (1 + 𝑟1)E(𝐼1),𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑤𝑤 = (1 + 𝑟2𝑤𝑤)E(𝐼2), (3) 2𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 + 𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 . (4) 
From Eq. (1), it follows that 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 . We assume that the insurance premium 
increases, on average, due to climate change, i.e., 𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1. Moreover, it 
is assumed that:  
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 because insurers have to be compensated for bearing the risk of fluctuating 
reinsurance costs.2 Note that although MY is more expensive than SY, risk averse farmers 
might prefer MY to avoid price uncertainty. 
2.2 Modeling farmers’ insurance choices 
Farmers are assumed to have an additive inter-temporal utility 𝑉 = 𝑈1 + 𝑈2 where 𝑈(⋅) is a 
one-period utility function depending on net incomes at 𝑡1  and 𝑡2, respectively. 3  Given 
Eq. (2), the expected utility of purchasing an insurance contract in one period is:  E𝑈(−𝑃𝑃,𝛽𝑖) = E𝐹𝑦𝑡E𝐹𝜀𝑖𝑈(𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇) + 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝑖),𝑃𝑃 ∈ �𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1,𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑤𝑤 ,𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆� (5) 
and the expected utility without an insurance contract is: E𝑈(0,𝛽𝑖) = E𝐹𝑦𝑡E𝐹𝜀𝑖𝑈(𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇) + 𝜀𝑖). (6) 
Farmers face a discrete choice set consisting of buying MY or SY, or choosing no insurance 
(NI) for two periods (Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1 Farmers’ insurance choices 
 
  
2 A&O cost, which are probably smaller for MY than for SY, are not taken into account. 
3 We ignore discounting of utility at 𝑡2. 
Insurance choices 
for Farmer i 
SY at 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 SY at 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2
𝑤𝑤  
NI 
NI 
SY at 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑤𝑤  
NI 
MY at 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 MY at 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 
𝑡1 
 
𝑡2 
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We solve the decision problem via dynamic programming. The decision rule of farmer 𝑖 
𝐷2(𝛽𝑖,𝑤) at 𝑡2 follows:  
𝐷2(𝛽,𝑤) = � MY, if the decision at  t1,𝐷1(𝛽𝑖) = MY,SY, if E𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑤𝑤 ,𝛽𝑖) ≥ E𝑈(0,𝛽𝑖) and 𝐷1(𝛽𝑖) ≠ MY,NI, if E𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑤𝑤 ,𝛽𝑖) < E𝑈(0,𝛽𝑖) and 𝐷1(𝛽𝑖) ≠ MY.  (7) 
Farmers who buy MY at 𝑡1, hold MY also at 𝑡2 by definition. Otherwise, they decide to buy 
SY or NI based on their expected utility at each state of the world 𝑤. At 𝑡1, the optimal choice 
set 𝐷1(𝛽𝑖) is: 
𝐷1(𝛽) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
MY, E𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆(𝛽𝑖) = 2E𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆,𝛽𝑖),SY, E𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝛽𝑖) = E𝑈�−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1,𝛽𝑖� + 𝑞max�E𝑈�−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 ,𝛽𝑖�, E𝑈(0,𝛽𝑖)�+(1 − 𝑞)max�E𝑈�−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ,𝛽𝑖�, E𝑈(0,𝛽𝑖)�,NI, E𝑉𝑁𝐼(𝛽𝑖) = E𝑈(0,𝛽𝑖) + 𝑞max�E𝑈�−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 ,𝛽𝑖�, E𝑈(0,𝛽𝑖)�+(1 − 𝑞)max�E𝑈�−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ,𝛽𝑖�, E𝑈(0,𝛽𝑖)�.
 (8) 
The optimal decision 𝐷1(𝛽𝑖) for farmer 𝑖 satisfies:  
𝐷1(𝛽𝑖) = argmax
𝑧
[E𝑉𝑧(𝛽𝑖)|𝑧], 𝑧 ∈ {MY, SY, NI}. (9) 
To determine the aggregated demand 𝐴1(𝑧) for insurance contracts, we introduce the indicator 
function 𝕀 and define the aggregated demand for 𝑧 ∈ {MY, SY, NI} at 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 as:  A1(𝑧) = ∫  ℬ 𝕀{𝐷1(𝛽)=𝑧}𝑑𝐹𝛽; A2(𝑧,𝑤) = ∫  ℬ 𝕀{𝐷2(𝛽,𝑤𝑤)=𝑧}𝑑𝐹𝛽 (10) 
When MY and SY are both offered in the insurance market, the total expected insurance 
demand for both periods is:  A𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = ∑  𝑧∈{𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆} {A1(𝑧) + A2(𝑧,𝑤)}. (11) 
If only SY is offered, the total expected insurance demand for both periods equals:  A𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = ∑  𝑧∈{𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆} {A1(𝑧) + A2(𝑧,𝑤)}. (12) 
2.3 Solution 
In this section, we derive the optimal insurance type for each farmer as a function of the 
hedging effectiveness 𝛽. We strive for a closed form solution and throughout there are two 
simplifying assumptions. First, we assume an exponential utility function 𝑢(𝑥) = −exp(−𝑎𝑥) 
with absolute risk aversion 𝑎 . Second, we assume 𝐹𝜀𝑖  and 𝐹𝑦𝑡  to be normal distributions 
truncated at [𝜀𝑖,min,  𝜀𝑖,max]  and [0, 𝑦max] . Using the utility expression of Norgaard and 
Killeen (1980), Eq. (5) becomes  
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E𝑈(−𝑃𝑃,𝛽𝑖) = − exp�−𝑎𝜇𝑖 + 𝑎2𝜎𝑖22 �𝜙𝜀𝑖 
 �exp �−𝑎𝑦𝑐 + 𝑎𝜇 + 𝑎𝑃𝑃 + 𝑎2(1−2𝛽𝑖)𝜎22 � 𝜙1 + exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃)𝜙2� exp(𝑎2𝜎2𝛽𝑖22 ), (13) 
where  
𝜙(𝑥min, 𝑥max, 𝜇,𝜎) = Φ{𝑎(𝑥max−𝜇𝜎 +𝜎)}−Φ{𝑎(𝑥min−𝜇𝜎 +𝜎)}Φ{𝑥max−𝜇
𝜎
}−Φ{𝑥min−𝜇
𝜎
} , (14) 
Φ(⋅)  is standard normal CDF, 𝜙𝜀𝑖 =  𝜙�𝜀𝑖,min, 𝜀𝑖,max, 0,𝜎𝑖� , 𝜙1 = 𝜙(0,𝑦𝑐, 𝜇,𝜎) , and 
𝜙2 = 𝜙(𝑦𝑐,𝑦max, 𝜇,𝜎). Similarly, Eq. (6) becomes E𝑈(0,𝛽𝑖) = −exp(𝑎2𝛽𝑖2𝜎22 )𝜙0exp(−𝑎𝜇𝑖 + 𝑎2𝜎𝑖22 )𝜙𝜀𝑖 , (15) 
where 𝜙0 = 𝜙(0,𝑦max, 𝜇,𝜎). 
In a first step, we examine a situation where only SY is available. Given 
𝑃𝑃 ∈ {𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1,𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 ,𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 }, a farmer chooses SY only if E𝑈(−𝑃𝑃,𝛽) ≥ E𝑈(0,𝛽). Inserting Eq. 
(13) and (15), this inequality becomes:  
exp{𝑎𝜇 − 𝑎𝑦𝑐 + 𝑎𝑃𝑃 + 𝑎2𝜎2(1 − 2𝛽)2 }𝜙1 + exp{𝑎𝑃𝑃}𝜙2 ≤ 𝜙0. 
Solving for 𝛽 yields:  
𝛽 ≥
1
𝑎2𝜎2
{𝐶 − log( 1
exp(𝑎𝑃) − 𝜙2𝜙0)}, (16) 
where 𝐶 = log(𝜙1/𝜙0) + 𝑎𝜇 − 𝑎𝑦𝑐 + 𝑎2𝜎2/2. Thus, the critical 𝛽s for farmers to choose SY 
at 𝑡2 and 𝑡1 are:  
𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑤𝑤 = 1
𝑎2𝜎2
{𝐶 − log( 1
exp(𝑎𝑃𝑆𝑌,2𝑤 ) − 𝜙2𝜙0)}, (17) 
and  
𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 = 1
𝑎2𝜎2
{𝐶 − log( 1
exp(𝑎𝑃𝑆𝑌,1) − 𝜙2𝜙0)}, respectively. (18) 
Note that a critical 𝛽 exists only if  
1
exp(𝑎𝑃) − 𝜙2𝜙0 > 0 → 𝑃𝑃 < 1𝑎 log(𝜙0𝜙2), (19) 
implying that insurance premiums depend on risk reduction determined by 𝑦max and 𝑦𝑐 in the 
insurance program. The critical 𝛽s are monotonously increasing in 𝑃𝑃. Thus, 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 ≤
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 , which implies that 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑑 ≤ 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 ≤ 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 . Thresholds 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1  and 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑤𝑤  divide 
6 
farmers into insured and uninsured (see Table 1). Farmers with 𝛽 ≥ 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 buy SY regardless 
the uncertainty of 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑤𝑤 . If 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢, farmers prefer SY at 𝑡1, but at 𝑡2 they buy SY 
only if 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑤𝑤  decreases. Farmers falling in the range 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑑 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 will buy SY in case 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑  at 𝑡2. Farmers with 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑑 will not buy insurance in either period. 
Next, we investigate a situation where both SY and MY contracts are offered. As 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1, 
MY can only be attractive to farmers who would also buy SY at 𝑡1. Thus, only farmers with 
𝛽 ≥ 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 and 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 will possibly choose MY.  
Farmers with 𝛽 ≥ 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 prefer MY to SY only if:  2𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆,𝛽) ≥ 𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1,𝛽) + 𝑞𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 ,𝛽) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ,𝛽). (20) 
Eq. (20) holds if:  2exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆) ≤ exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1) + 𝑞exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 ) + (1 − 𝑞)exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ). (21) 
Eq. (21) is fulfilled due to Eq. (4) and the convexity of an exponential function. Thus, farmers 
with 𝛽 ≥ 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 choose MY. 
Farmers with 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 prefer MY to SY/NI only if:  2𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆,𝛽) ≥ 𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1,𝛽) + 𝑞𝑈(0,𝛽) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑈(−𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ,𝛽). (22) 
Similarly, we obtain:  
𝛽 ≥
1
𝑎2𝜎2
{𝐶 − log( 𝑞
𝐶1
−
𝜙2
𝜙0
)} ≡ 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆, (23) 
where 𝐶 = log(𝜙1/𝜙0) + 𝑎𝜇 − 𝑎𝑦𝑐 + 𝑎2𝜎2/2  and 𝐶1 = 2exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆) − exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1) −(1 − 𝑞)exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ).  
According to Eq. (23), farmers with 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 choose MY whereas farmers with 
𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 prefer SY at 𝑡1 and also at 𝑡2 given that 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 . Table 1 summarizes the 
optimal decision space as a function of the hedging effectiveness 𝛽. Note that farmers with 
𝛽 ≥ 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 exchange SY for MY when it is offered. As a result, the total expected insurance 
participation increases because farmers with 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 hold MY instead of NI at 
𝑡2 (𝑤 = 𝑢). 
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Table 1: Thresholds for Farmers' Decision between MY, SY, and NI 
Threshold 
Only SY SY and MY 
𝑡1 𝑡2 𝑡1 𝑡2 
 𝑤 = 𝑑 𝑤 = 𝑢  𝑤 = 𝑑 𝑤 = 𝑢 
𝛽 ≥ 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 SY SY SY MY MY MY 
𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 
SY SY NI 
MY MY MY 
𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 SY SY NI 
𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑑 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1 NI SY NI NI SY NI 
𝛽 < 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑑 NI NI NI NI NI NI 
 
With the threshold values for 𝛽, we can derive the expected total insurance demand 𝐴 without 
and with MY as follows: A𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 2𝑛 − {𝐹(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1) + 𝑞𝐹(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢) + (1 − 𝑞)𝐹(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑑)},A𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 2𝑛 − {𝐹(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1) + 𝑞𝐹(𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆) + (1 − 𝑞)𝐹(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑑)}.  (24) 
PROPOSITION 2.1  
(i) The expected total demand with MY and SY is greater or equal to that with only SY, i.e., A𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ≥ A𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 .  
(ii) The variance of the total insurance demand over time with MY and SY is smaller or equal to 
that with only SY, i.e., 𝑉𝑎𝑟(A𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(A𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆).  
Proof.  
(i) We rewrite A𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − A𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑞{𝐹(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢) − 𝐹(𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆)} via Eq. (24). Using Eq. (16) and 
(23) yields:  
𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 ≤ 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢 ⇔ 𝐶1 ≤ 𝑞exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 ) 
⇔ 2exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆) − exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,1) − (1 − 𝑞)exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑑 ) ≤ 𝑞exp(𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2𝑢 ),  
which holds under Eq. (21). Thus, 𝐹𝛽(𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆) ≤ 𝐹𝛽(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢) completes the proof. 
(ii) Demand variances at 𝑡2 are:  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(A𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = (𝑞 − 𝑞2){𝐹𝛽(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢) − 𝐹𝛽(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑑)}2
𝑉𝑎𝑟(A𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = (𝑞 − 𝑞2){𝐹𝛽(𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆) − 𝐹𝛽(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑑)}2.   
The assertion follows from 𝐹𝛽(𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆) ≤ 𝐹𝛽(𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,2,𝑢).  
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We conclude that the introduction of MY can, in fact, increase and stabilize insurance 
participation provided that potential buyers of insurance are sufficiently heterogeneous. 
 
3 Illustration for U.S. Corn Producers 
In this section, we illustrate how multi-year area yield insurances might perform for U.S. corn 
producers. Due to the lack of individual farm data, we use county-level corn yield data and 
consider these as representative corn producers. Area yields are at the state-level.4 The annual 
county and state yields (bushels per acre) between 1975 and 2012 are collected from nine states 
located in the "Corn Belt". To calculate revenue from corn production, we choose prices ($ per 
bushels) in 2012 for each state. Price and yield data are made available by the USDA National 
Agricultural Statistical Service. 
Coefficients 𝛽𝑖  that measure the sensitivity of representative producers’ yields at the 
county-level to area yield at the state-level are presented in Fig. 2. The estimates of 𝛽𝑖 are 
derived from the empirical distribution of county-level corn yields.5  
 
Figure 2: 𝜷s for Representative Farmers 
In Fig. 2, representative farmers’ 𝛽s vary from 0.2 to 2.3, but most are between 1.3 and 1.9. 
Among the nine selected states, Nebraska and Kansas are most heterogeneous in terms of the 𝛽 
4 In practice, area yields are usually measured at the county-level, such as in the Group Risk Plan offered by the 
Risk Management Agency (Deng et al., 2007). 
5 It is well-known that using county-level data leads to biased estimates of farm-level variances and correlation 
(Coble et al., 2007). To mitigate the bias in 𝛽𝑖, we inflate standard deviations of county-level yields by a factor 
1.67 and deflate the correlation between county yields and state yields by a factor 0.94. These factors are borrowed 
from Coble et al. (2007) who report variances and correlations for corn at the farm-level, county-level, and 
state-level in the United States. 
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distribution, whereas Iowa is the most homogeneous. Recalling the theoretical result from the 
previous section, it is more likely to see a coexistence of SY and MY in the former states than in 
the latter. 
The calculation of farmers’ optimal insurance decision requires the specification of absolute 
risk aversions 𝑎 as well as parameters {𝑟𝑡𝑤𝑤, 𝑞} that determine insurance premiums for SY and 
MY. Following Kirkwood (1997), we assume that average absolute risk aversion for all farmers 
in each state is 1
0.1×(Incomemax−Incomemin). The strike value 𝑦𝑐 is defined as the 30% quantile of 
𝑦𝑡. The probability 𝑞 of 𝑤 = 𝑢 is assumed to be 0.5 as in Kleindorfer et al. (2012). Risk 
loading in the first period, 𝑟1, is 0.1, which follows Group Risk Plan’s actual rating procedure 
in the U.S. (Deng et al., 2007). Finally, we assume that the insurance premiums in the second 
period either increase or decrease by 20%.6 These specifications are the same for all considered 
states, however, the insurance premiums 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  or 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆  and critical 𝛽 s vary across states 
depending on the average corn yields of each state.  
Fig. 3 depicts the representative farmers’ decisions when only SY contracts are offered (left 
panel) and when SY and MY contracts are both offered in the market (right panel). Given the 
assumed risk aversion and risk loading, a rather low participation in (unsubsidized) SY can be 
observed with the exception of Iowa and Minnesota. The results confirm that area yield 
insurance is more attractive in homogeneous regions, such as Iowa. SY demands vary 
considerably between 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 due to the change in insurance premiums. Fig. 3d-3f show 
that MY and SY coexist if both contract types are offered. Comparing the left and the right 
panel of Fig. 3 reveals that the main effect is a substitution of SY with MY contracts. Moreover, 
the number of uninsured farmers decreases. The increase of the total insurance participation, 
however, is rather moderate. 
  
6 The U.S. Risk Management Agency, for example, adjusted the premium rate for 2013, resulting in a maximum 
20 percent change (increase or decrease) in yield protection premium, on average, compared to 2012 (Risk 
Management Agency, 2012).  
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 Figure 3: Farmers’ optimal insurance choices 
 
 
  
a: SY distribution at 𝑡1 d: SY and MY distributions at 𝑡1 
  
b: SY distribution at 𝑡2 where 𝑤 = 𝑑 e: SY and MY distributions at 𝑡2 where 𝑤 = 𝑑 
  
c: SY distribution at 𝑡2 where 𝑤 = 𝑢 f: SY and MY distributions at 𝑡2 where 𝑤 = 𝑢 
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4 Conclusion 
This paper investigated if farmers’ participation in private, unsubsidized crop insurance can be 
increased by offering multi-year insurance contracts with stable insurance premiums in addition 
to single-year insurance contracts. By means of a dynamic choice model, we show that there is 
a demand for multi-year insurance and that both types of insurances can co-exist. In contrast to 
previous studies, this result is not based on a time diversification argument. Moreover, we show 
that the total expected insurance participation increases when both insurance contracts are 
offered to farmers, i.e., the introduction of multi-year insurance contracts enhances the market 
penetration of insurance products. It turned out that this effect is moderate when applying the 
model to U.S. corn production. In practice, however, the increase of insurance demand could be 
more pronounced because we did not consider marketing and administrative costs and thus 
ignore this cost reduction potential of multi-year insurance.  
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